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FOREWORD
TOUGH LOVE: THE COURT OF APPEALS RUNS THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT THE OLD FASHIONED WAY
LINDA R. HIRSHMAN*

Every law school class has its Kingsfield. Mine was Geoffrey Hazard. One day, after a particularly intimidating civil procedure class, I
asked one of my fellow students why he thought a teacher would act like
that. "It's to get us toughened up for the abuse we're going to have to
take from the judges when we get out," he replied knowingly. "Aha," I
thought to myself, "So this law school experience is simply art imitating
life." But when I got out and started appearing in courtrooms, the judges
were generally rather agreeable. They certainly didn't act like law
professors. So when, many years later, I read that President Ronald
Reagan had selected several federal judges from among the faculty of my
law school, I figured that things had come full circle. Life would now
imitate art.
In fairness, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which is the subject of this symposium, includes only two products
of the University of Chicago Law School faculty, Judges Richard Posner
and Frank Easterbrook; a third professor, Kenneth Ripple, formerly of
the Notre Dame Law School, completes the academic complement of the
ten active judges. Judge Posner, a Republican appointee (Reagan), is a
distinguished academic who pioneered the application of economic analysis to law. Judge Easterbrook, another Reagan appointee, is also of an
economic bent. Despite his relative youth, he has published extensively
about antitrust, corporate and securities issues. Judge Ripple, a third
Reagan appointee, was a Special Assistant to Justice Warren Burger for
six years before joining the faculty at Notre Dame. The other members
of the court, whose decisions will be the subject of this issue, are:
(1) Walter J. Cummings, Democratic appointee (Johnson), who just
completed his term as Chief Judge of the circuit, practicing attorney
before appointment to the circuit in 1966; (2) William J. Bauer, newly
installed as Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit, a Republican appointee
to the court (Ford), former United States Attorney and federal and state
* Professor of Law, I.I.T. Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1966, Cornell University; J.D.
1969, University of Chicago.
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trial judge with a special interest in the criminal law; (3) Harlington
Wood, Jr., from Springfield, a Republican appointee (Ford), former federal trial judge and Assistant Attorney General in the United States Justice Department; (4) Richard D. Cudahy, Democratic appointee
(Carter), Wisconsin businessman, lawyer and civic activist; (5) John L.
Coffey, Republican appointee (Reagan), a Wisconsin state judge since
1954, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court for four years before appointment to the federal court; (6) Joel M. Flaum, Republican appointee
(Reagan), former Assistant State's Attorney, Attorney General and first
Assistant U.S. Attorney, federal trial judge when appointed to the appeals court, a judge with a particular interest in criminal law. The newest member of the court, Daniel Manion, a Republican appointee
(Reagan), did not take his seat until after the decisions that are the subject of this symposium. In addition, panels on the Seventh Circuit often
include one of the senior judges or a visitor; en banc sessions include only
judges in active service and any senior judges who were on the original
panel. 1

In any case, because the court is heavily weighted toward judges
appointed by the conservative Ronald Reagan and because the appointees include very articulate and widely published advocates of somewhat
novel approaches to legal matters, there are lots of Seventh Circuit
watchers, both in the court's jurisdiction and nationally. Insofar as the
appointees of a conservative administration are likely to dominate the
population of the federal courts for some time to come, this Reagan dominated court's jurisprudence is an interesting harbinger. Moreover, this
degree of attention to a court of appeals seems entirely appropriate, since
the growth in federal litigation has not been accompanied by a concomitant increase in the output of the Supreme Court, and, accordingly, the
courts of appeals are frequently the ultimate arbiters of federal law.
In this first of the faculty symposiums on the work of the Seventh
Circuit, which will be published annually by the Chicago-Kent Law Review, each of three prominent scholars addresses an area where the
court's decisions have created a body of law that is substantively significant and also reflective of a more general approach to legal issues that
makes the Seventh Circuit particularly worth watching. 2 They are
1. During the period in question the senior judges included (1) Jesse E. Eschbach, a Reagan
appointee, a U.S. district court judge in Indiana for 19 years; (2) Thomas E. Fairchild, a former
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice, who was appointed by Johnson; (3) Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., a Nixon
appointee, who was formerly the director and chairman of a bank; and (4) Luther M. Swygert, a
Kennedy appointee, who was a U.S. district court judge in Indiana for 18 years.
2. Although the articles in this symposium issue focus somewhat on opinions authored by
them, Judges Posner and Easterbrook have not written significantly more opinions than the other
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(1) Professor Linda Silberman on the court's efforts to subject to more
stringent review the district courts' decisions regarding preliminary injunctive relief; (2) Professor James Holzhauer on the proper standard for
the courts to impose upon labor unions in enforcing the duty of fair representation; and (3) Professor Robert Glicksman on the retreat from judicial activism in environmental matters as represented by ten years of
unsuccessful efforts to find a federal avenue of enforcement for the
cleanup of the polluted Waukegan Harbor. In addition, the student contributors to this issue of the Law Review have selected several Seventh
Circuit cases as the focus of their note and comments. Although the
articles address very different subjects, the general understanding that
emerges is predictable and clear: this conservative court is strongly disinclined to use its authority to rearrange existing social, economic and
political distributions. The less predictable result of this symposium is
that the court's fresh approach stimulated each of the faculty authors to
reconsider the accepted wisdom of his area and, in each instance, to suggest altered ways of looking at the subjects. Thus, Linda Silberman reconsiders the desirability of a larger appellate presence in the preliminary
injunction decision, Jim Holzhauer suggests an entirely new set of standards for a duty of fair representation, and Bob Glicksman suggests that
the court's retreat from activism in environmental matters is symbolic of
a much broader withdrawal, based on fundamental concerns of separation of powers and institutional competency.
As the title of this foreword reflects, I intend to address briefly a less
substantive subject; namely, the court's efforts to impose demanding new
standards of litigation conduct in this circuit. There has been a fair
amount of talk about this in the popular and trade presses, lawyers
describing their mistreatment at the hands of an abusive tribunal, others
decrying the lawyers' inability or unwillingness to abide by even minimally demanding professional standards. Since standards of litigation
conduct apply to every case before the court, it seems appropriate for this
first symposium to include some report from the "front," if there is a
front.
Well, exactly what is different about the court's 3 behavior? This
foreword is not the appropriate forum to review six years of substantive
members of the court. A WESTLAW search revealed that, while Judge Posner led the field, authoring 122 opinions from June 30, 1985 to January 1, 1987, Judge Flaum also contributed 104 opinions
while Judges Easterbrook, Wood and Coffey each wrote over 90 opinions.
3. By "court," at least on the subject of this foreword, I mean all ten of the active members of
the court of appeals. The panels in the cases cited here included at one time or another each of the
ten active members of the court; of the cases involving litigation management, there are almost no
dissents or concurring opinions, and none of the cases elicited en banc reconsideration.
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decisions, ranging from interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code 4 to
the first amendment.5 A lot of writing on the court's general predilections exists already, 6 and the articles in this symposium detail the court's
development of two very important substantive areas of federal lawenvironmental protection and labor relations-as well as the quasi-managerial matter of the standards for preliminary injunctions. However, because the court's approach to managerial matters cannot be understood
outside the context of its overall substantive approach to the role of the
federal courts, I will suggest one overbroad generalization about the relationship between philosophy and management and support my general
proposition with one overly narrow example. The general proposition is
that, in the six years since the first of Ronald Reagan's appointees took
office in this circuit, the court's decisions have reflected a pattern, albeit
not unwavering, of reading narrowly the rights-creating provisions of
federal law, reducing the role that the federal courts play in the rearrangement of events as they occur in the world outside the courtroom.
My example is Walker v. Rowe. 7 In Walker, Judge Easterbrook,
writing for himself, then Chief Judge Walter Cummings and Judge James
Noland sitting by designation, reversed a jury verdict of almost a million
dollars against the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections
and the Assistant Warden of the Pontiac Correctional Center for damages to six prison guards hurt or killed in the 1978 riot at the prison. The
guards contended that the defendants were personally responsible for
conditions that enabled the prisoners to kill or injure the guards. The
question, asked Judge Easterbrook, was "whether acts and omissions
[colorably the personal responsibility of the defendants] violate the Constitution."' 8 The answer, according to the court, was no-the Constitution, the court held, is a charter of negative liberties, not obligating the
state to protect people, even its prison guards, from danger. 9
The most interesting aspect of Walker v. Rowe is the court's exegesis
of the philosophical reasons justifying its restrictive reading of the constitutional language. According to the court, when it comes to the affirmative provision of goods, governments regularly make choices, including
4. Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986).
5. Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983).
6. E.g., Cohen, Posnerian Jurisprudenceand Economic Analysis of Law: The View From The
Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (1985); Michelman, Reflections on Professional Education, Legal
Scholarship, and the Law-and-Economics Movement, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 197 (1983); Samuel &
Mercuro, PosnerianLaw and Economics on the Bench, 4 INr't REV. L. & ECON. 107 (1984).
7. 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986).
8. Id. at 509.
9. Id. at 510.
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sacrificing safety of their employees for other ends, and "[t]he level of
safety to be provided... is [to be] determined by political and economic
forces, not by juries implementing the due process clause." 10 At the end
of the opinion, the court is even more explicit:
Pontiac is a den of murderers, rapists, and others with no respect for
the law-and all too often nothing to lose from further mayhem. If
there are few guards, the prisoners will murder each other; if the
guards are present in abundance, the guards may become the targets; if
the guards lock the prisoners in their cells, all will suffer to prevent
violence by a few. There is no solution within the reach of a federal
court, no easy recourse in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The state has many choices, all costly, many bound to
end in tragedy for someone. It may make these tragic choices for
itself. II
The opinion is thus a paradigm of the court's commitment to reducing
the role of the federal judiciary vis-d-vis the federal legislature, the states,
and, as Walker so graphically illustrates, the vicissitudes of life itself.
This substantive commitment to minimize the reach of the federal courts
is the background against which the Seventh Circuit's procedural directives must be viewed.
In light of the philosophy expressed in Walker, it is not surprising to
find, on the procedural or managerial side, a line of decisions raising jurisdictional barriers to the federal courthouse.1 2 This development has
two forms: first, the court examines, sua sponte, questions of the subject
matter jurisdiction of the trial court; then in deciding the questions, the
court construes strictly the jurisdictional rules. The court signalled its
intent to scrutinize on its own the jurisdictional credentials of the cases
on its docket in its 1983 decision in Gaunce v. deVincentis, dismissing for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction a case that erroneously challenged
agency action in district court, rather than following the proper channels
of administrative review. In its opinion, the court reminded the bar that
it had just amended the Circuit Rules to require all appellants to file with
their briefs a summary of the bases for both the district court and appel13
late jurisdiction.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 512 (citation omitted).
12. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986); Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1986); Stockman v. LaCroix, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.
1986); Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1986); Christianson v. Colt Indus., 798
F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1986); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1986); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1986); Wilsey v. Eddingfield, 780 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1660 (1986); Casio, Inc. v. S.M. & R. Co., 755 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1985); Bernstein
v. Lind-Waldock, 738 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1984); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 749 F.2d 1235 (7th
Cir. 1984); Gaunce v. deVincentis, 708 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 978 (1983).
13. Gaunce v. deVincentis, 708 F.2d 1290, 1291 n.l (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 978 (1983)
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Inevitably, when jurisdictional issues first surface at the appellate
level, bizarre consequences ensue. Probably my favorite example from
the Seventh Circuit is FederalDepositInsurance Corp. v. Elefant, 4 a case
resembling nothing so much as a law school examination that all parties
below failed miserably. As the author of the opinion, Judge Easterbrook,
described the case, "[a] simple action to collect a debt has produced a
host of problems, all jurisdictional.""5 The case began when United of
America Bank, an Illinois citizen, made a loan to the ITRI Torah Institute, allegedly a New York corporation, with two Illinois residents as
guarantors. The bank got into trouble, and the FDIC, which guaranteed
some of the deposits, sued the Torah Institute and its guarantors in Illinois state court. The New York defendant removed the whole case, asserting diversity of citizenship. The alert civil procedure student will by
now have spotted at least two jurisdictional problems, but, as the court of
appeals pointed out, "everyone acted as if the whole action had been
moved to district court, and the district judge never noticed the jurisdictional problems (of which there are more to come)." 1 6 The district court
granted summary judgment against ITRI and one of the two guarantors,
deferring consideration of other claims in the case.
Having removed and lost, defendants appealed, contending that the
district court should not have exercised diversity jurisdiction over the
FDIC at all. The FDIC, having won on the merits in federal district
court, agreed nonetheless that the removal was improper and sought a
remand for the district court to explore another possible ground for jurisdiction. After having been silent throughout the trial on the jurisdictional problems, including those in its own unique statute, the FDIC also
asked for $16,000 in attorneys' fees against the defendants for improper

removal! 17
(citing Circuit Rule 9(b)). One of the few truths that has emerged from the tug of war between
counsel and the court is that neither side can claim a decisive victory. The court imposed strict new
filing requirements, and the clerk's office allowed lawyers to file looseleaf inserts containing the required material if and when the advocates were called on their omissions. Last year, when the court
ordered the clerk's office to return all nonconforming briefs, HALF of the briefs filed that day had to
be sent backl 7th Circuit Scholarly, Conservative, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Vol. 132, No. 82, April
26, 1986, p. 1.
14. 790 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1986).
15. Id. at 662.
16. Id. at 663.
17. As if all of this were not enough, the court of appeals first engaged in its increasingly common practice of making an independent inquiry into its own jurisdiction. The case was before it
under Rule 54(b), which permits the entry of partial final judgment, with attendant rights of appeal,
even though the whole case is not concluded. In this case, the court sustained its jurisdiction on the
grounds that the defendants' basic liability was clear, even without resolution of the remaining
claims. I note the Rule 54 inquiry only because, like the inquiry into the trial court's jurisdiction,
the appellate jurisdictional inquiry also appears with increasing frequency in the opinions. Interest-
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The substance of the jurisdictional argument was as follows. If the
FDIC took the citizenship of the bank, the case obviously did not qualify
for diversity jurisdiction, because several of the defendants were also Illinois citizens. By the time the case got to the court of appeals, the parties
had shifted their positions to treat the FDIC as a citizen of the District of
Columbia. The removing defendants contended on appeal that the
FDIC's statute 8 nonetheless precludes federal diversity jurisdiction
where the FDIC is acting as a receiver for a state bank. This is a tough
argument, because the FDIC statute, drafted in 1935, said nothing about
diversity jurisdiction but merely precluded the use of federal question
jurisdiction in that circumstance. (As the court of appeals explained, this
limitation in the jurisdictional preclusion was understandable, because a
government agency was not qualified for diversity citizenship until 1958,
when the diversity statute was amended to provide for corporate citizenship for diversity purposes.)
The court of appeals was thus confronted with a neat problem in
statutory interpretation. Congress' purpose in 1935 was clearly to avoid
transferring whole bodies of garden variety state collection suits to the
federal courts just because the FDIC was involved. But the statute is
silent about diversity. Judge Easterbrook is the author of many scholarly
articles and opinions exhorting the courts to respect strictly statutory
language, however confining. 19 Nonetheless, in this case, he stretched
the statutory language to prohibit the assertion of jurisdiction, explaining
his decision on the grounds that this was that rare case where the legislative record was clear enough for the court to infer Congress' intent. 20
The case, having proceeded to summary judgment in the federal court,
would now be sent back to state court to begin again.
A final word: the court did not give the FDIC its attorneys' fees.
The FDIC should have noted the obvious defects of nondiversity in the
defendants' original removal, said the court. Moreover, the court found
it difficult to tag defendants with foreseeing the court's expansive interpretation of the FDIC statute, which does not even mention diversity,
when the FDIC did not even realize its potential application. In passing,
ingly, the court, which is very tight-fisted about the trial court jurisdiction, usually finds in favor of
its own jurisdiction to review, even where the right to appeal is far from clear. E.g., Palmer v.
Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Wagner, 808 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1986); McMunn v.
Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 791 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1986); FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.
1986); Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1986).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 Fourth (1982).
19. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Easterbrook,
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
20. Elefant, 790 F.2d at 666.
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the court of appeals reminded the district court that it, too, should at
least have picked up the easy points.
A second group of litigation management decisions involves the
strict enforcement in cases otherwise within the jurisdiction of the district court of door closing provisions like statutes of limitations, issue and
claim preclusion and the narrow reading of relief provisions like the reopeners and transfer rules. 2 1 One such decision, Marrese v. American
Academy of OrthopaedicSurgeons,2 2 in which the court, en banc, applied
the doctrine of claim preclusion to preclude litigation of federal antitrust
claims after state claims have been resolved against the plaintiff, has been
the subject not only of reversal but of much criticism. 23 Nonetheless,
looking at the general pattern of litigation over the last year, I do not see
significant numbers of cases in which the court enforced such rules with
exceptional harshness; usually in this second group of cases, the court of
appeals is simply affirming the district court's rulings.
One such case, Cote v. Wadel,24 is interesting as a possible harbinger
of a harsher future, although I tend to think that decision is more understandable as a reflection of the court's interest in strict enforcement of the
personal jurisdiction rules, as a subset of its tight-fisted jurisdiction rulings generally. In Cote, the plaintiff, who had very bad luck with her
professional relationships, was suing her former lawyers for malpractice
in failing to prosecute her original, medical malpractice action against
her doctor. Her second set of lawyers sued the lawyer defendants in Wisconsin, where the plaintiff lived, although the defendants apparently resided in Michigan, where the original malpractice action had been
litigated. The Wisconsin federal district court dismissed the Michigan
lawyer defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and, in a rather unexceptional opinion by Judge Posner, the court of appeals affirmed. The
harder issue was the court's affirmance of the district court decision to
dismiss, rather than transferring the case, under section 1404(a) of Title
28, resulting in plaintiff's total exclusion from any courthouse, because,
21. Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1986); Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor, 795 F.2d 601
(7th Cir. 1986); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986); Rudell v. Comprehensive Accounting, 802 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1986); cf Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th
Cir. 1986); Bieganek v. Taylor, 801 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1986).
22. 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982), modified, 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983), modified on reh'g
en banc, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
23. Burbank, InterurisdictionalPreclusions,Full Faith and Credit and FederalCommon Law:
A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986); Burbank, Symposium: Preclusion in a FederalSystem: Afterwords: A Response to ProfessorHazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 659 (1985); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1140-42; Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements:Antitrust as History, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1013 (1985).
24. 796 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1986).

FOREWORD: TOUGH LOVE

in the meanwhile, the statute of limitations had run. Although the court
of appeals agreed with the plaintiff that the transfer provisions of the
United States Code would have allowed the trial court to transfer and
save the plaintiff's action, it refused to find a clear abuse of discretion,
concluding that the harsh result was justified, because the lawyers' mistake was "elementary" and "litigants and the public will benefit substantially in the long run from better compliance with the rules limiting
'25
personal jurisdiction.
In the third and largest group of management matters, the court has
been visibly wielding the stick, imposing fees and other sanctions against
both parties and their attorneys with an unprecedentedly heavy hand for
frivolous litigation and for failure to meet the court's performance expectations. Many statutes and rules of procedure authorize the federal
courts to impose attorneys' fees and other sanctions like costs, 26 but four
provisions encompass most of the courts' authority to punish just general
bad actors. They are Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and sections 1912
and 1927 of Title 28.
Rule 11, newly drafted in 1983 as part of an effort to give trial
judges more authority over the litigation process, requires attorneys to
sign pleadings, certificating thereby that the pleading is well grounded in
fact and existing law or a good faith argument for changing the law.
Violation of Rule 11 can result in fees and sanctions either to the party or
the attorney. Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes the court of appeals to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals.
Section 1912 provides for damages and costs to the prevailing party on
appeal for his delay, and section 1927 authorizes any federal court to
charge costs to attorneys personally for multiplying the proceedings vexatiously. Thus, both the district courts and the courts of appeals have
the authority to sanction a party or a lawyer or both, in proper cases
under the rules.
Rule 38 and section 1927 are more pertinent to an examination of
the appeals court's decisions than is Rule 11, because the decision to levy
27
sanctions under Rule 11 is within the discretion of the trial court.
Since the revision of Rule 11 in 1983, the court of appeals has generally
affirmed the district courts' Rule 11 decisions, although I should note
25. Id. at 985.
26. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); FED. R.
Civ. P. 11; FED. R. App. P. 38.

27. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); Suslick v.
Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984).
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that affirming the district courts in this circuit has led to some pretty
aggressive fee decisions. For example, in Wang v. Gordon,28 the court of
appeals approved the district court's sua sponte entry of a fee award it
had levied. Another example is Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,29 a
decision predating Rule 11, where the court affirmed the imposition of
attorneys' fees against lawyers fighting a motion to disqualify them, penalizing the lawyers for making contentions sufficiently meritorious to
elicit one dissent in support of the disfavored contentions and at least one
30
more vote for a rehearing en banc.
In a couple of recent cases, Thornton v. Wahl,31 and Dreis & Krump
Manufacturing v. IAM, 32 the appeals court went even further and disagreed with the lower court's refusals to impose fees under Rule 11. Procedurally, Dreis & Krump is a relatively straightforward remand
requiring a fee award, but Thornton is a bit murkier. In Thornton, the
district court had denied the fee request. Finding the plaintiff's same
contentions on appeal to be "without support," the court of appeals on
its own motion awarded defendants double costs and attorneys' fees for
the appellate proceedings. 33 The only authority the court mentioned for
this fee award was Rule 11, although technically, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, including Rule 11, do not apply in the courts of
34
appeals.
Both Dreis & Krump and Thornton involve fact situations of a particularly provoking sort. Thornton was a failed civil rights action that
was the most recent salvo in an eight year divorce battle, and Dreis &
Krump was an employer's suit to set aside an arbitration award under a
collective bargaining agreement. In each case, the issuance of sanctions
was obviously driven by the court's conviction that the appellant was
litigating for reasons unrelated to its confidence in the soundness of its
legal position: "This suit is Mrs. Thornton's revenge" 35 and "[a] company dissatisfied with the decisions of labor arbitrators need not include
an arbitration clause in its collective bargaining contracts, but having
agreed to include such a clause it will not be permitted to nullify the
advantages to the union by spinning out the arbitral process unconscion28. 715 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983).
29. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
30. Id. at 1265.
31. 787 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S, Ct. 93 (1986).
32. 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986).
33. Thornton, 787 F.2d at 1154.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The lawyer in a recent disciplinary case, In re Kelley, 808 F.2d 549
(7th Cir. 1986), tagged the court with a similar misappropriation of Rule 11.
35. Thornton, 787 F.2d at 1152.
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ably through the filing of meritless suits and appeals. '3 6
Normally when the court acts on its own behalf, it levies a sanction
for frivolous appeal under Rule 38 or uses section 1927 to direct the
sanction to the offending attorney for conduct on appeal. Current Seventh Circuit Rule 38 jurisprudence began with Ruderer v. Fines,37 where
the court imposed double costs and fees on a pro se plaintiff, who had
been the enfant terrible of the United States courts since his dismissal
from government employment in 1965. At the time of the Seventh Circuit decision, the plaintiff had filed sixty-eight different lawsuits to vindicate his contentions regarding his discharge, resulting ultimately in six
federal courts issuing injunctions against him approaching the federal
building. 38 The court used Ruderer to set out the tests for Rule 38: first,
the appeal must be frivolous, meaning something more than just unsuccessful, and, second, it must be appropriate to impose sanctions, meaning
that they would serve to deter a vexatious litigant or compensate his victim for his trouble.
Ruderer was an easy case, as are most of them. A big part of the
court's Rule 38 decisions fall into two categories: public fanatics and
private fanatics. The public fanatics include such crusaders as tax
protesters 39 and a group that concocts bogus land titles. 4° The court has
been resorting to fixed fines for such litigation, in order to save the government the trouble of calculating its attorneys fees for opposing them.
The category of private crusaders includes a mixed bag of individuals, whose cases are characterized by a Dickensian persistence coupled
with representation by a family member. 4t Perhaps the most graphic example from this group is Margoles v. Johns, a 1986 decision in a case
begun in 1972 as a slander action. The plaintiff, who had challenged the
36. Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 255.
37. 614 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 1130.
39. See, e.g., Granado v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1986); Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986); Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 86 (1985); Granzow v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Easterbrook described tax protest in his usual felicitous style: "Some people believe with great fervor preposterous
things that just happen to coincide with their self-interest. 'Tax protestors' have convinced themselves that wages are not income, that only gold is money, that the Sixteenth Amendment is unconstitutional, and so on." Coleman, 791 F.2d at 69.
40. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1986); Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754
(7th Cir. 1986); Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1644 (1986). The land title litigants apparently contend that original federal land patents preclude
the formation of any other interests in land under state law. They file their homemade land patents
with the appropriate title system and proceed to litigate about encumbrances, like mortgages, to
their land.
41. See, e.g., Margoles v. Johns, 798 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1986); Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 784
F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986); Spiegel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 790 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1986).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

neutrality of the first judge in his case, had been dismissed by the second
judge (to whom the case was transferred in an unrelated administrative
move) for failure to comply with defendants' discovery requests. Plaintiff's motion to reopen under Rule 60 and his appeal were unsuccessful.
Four years later, he moved again under Rule 60 to reopen the dismissal
on the grounds that the second judge was biased, too. A third district
judge, to whom the Rule 60 motion was assigned, denied it, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. The 1986 appeal was from denial of a third
Rule 60 motion, this time to vacate the dismissal of his action on the
grounds that he had new evidence to show that the second district judge
was biased. The court of appeals assessed the plaintiff $2500.00 in fees
42
for a frivolous appeal.
These are the easy cases. A handful of cases fall into a more troublesome third category: where the court finds the substantive contentions
insupportable in reason or precedent, although the cases bear none of the
warning signs that the legal system is deliberately being misused in service of an external agenda. For example, in Analytica, after affirming the
district court's decision to disqualify on the merits, the court, in an opinion by Judge Posner, then affirmed the imposition of costs on the lawyers
fighting disqualification, finding that the lawyers' position was "without
at least a colorable basis in law."' 43 But one of the three panel members-Judge Coffey-had dissented vigorously on the merits, agreeing
with the unsuccessful lawyers that the law on disqualification had
changed. Although a dissent does not make the penalized lawyers correct, it certainly casts doubt on the conclusion that their position was
"without colorable basis."
Judges Posner and Coffey were together again on the panel in Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore," which ultimately involved the
question of fee awards for litigation over fee awards. In the underlying
litigation, the court of appeals had reversed the Colts' efforts to maintain
an interpleader action against Baltimore. Judge Coffey dissented. On
remand from its successful appeal on the merits, Baltimore tried to get
the district judge to sock the Colts with attorneys' fees for having filed a
frivolous interpleader. The district judge refused. Baltimore appealed
the denial of fees, no doubt hoping that if Judge Coffey's dissent couldn't
protect the lawyers from charges of frivolity in Analytica, it wouldn't
shield the Colts, either. The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge
42. 798 F.2d at 1075.
43. 708 F.2d at 1269.
44. 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Coffey, ruled, not surprisingly, that the support of a member of the appellate court (himself) buttressed the reasonableness of the Colts' action,
despite its ultimate lack of success. The court thus affirmed the denial of
fees. Indeed, the court continued, so groundless was Baltimore's effort to
collect fees for its victory on the merits that its appeal would be characterized as frivolous, and the Colts, losers on the merits in the overall
litigation, could collect attorneys' fees for defending the appeal on fees!4 5
As set forth above, Judge Coffey, dissenting in Analytica, did not
vote for the fee award against the disqualified lawyers, and the third
panel member in Analytica and Colts was different." Judge Posner, however, sat on both panels and voted for fees both times, thus supporting
fees in face of a Coffey dissent in Analytica and supporting fees for the
effrontery of trying to collect fees in face of a Coffey dissent in Indianapolis Colts. The decisions in Colts and Analytica are disturbing, because, in
addition to a general preference for neatness of result, levying fees for
debatable positions absent clear signs of abuse of the system, "would
'chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories.' ,,47
Recent decisions include some other examples of sanctions where
the signs of abuse are far from clear. For example, in Wang v. Gordon,
also discussed above, the court affirmed the district court fee award on a
bad faith theory, although the plaintiff's contentions were drawn from a
Second Circuit decision not totally out of the ball park, and the worst
thing the appeals court could say about plaintiff's position was that it
was "strained. ' 48 In another example, Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.'49 the plaintiff was called to the police station, questioned by a
policeman and two complaining witnesses who were personal friends of
the policeman, arrested for vandalism at the insistence of the complainers, jailed for over ten hours despite his informing the police that he
could make bail, tried on the vandalism charges, and acquitted. Affirming the dismissal of his civil rights complaint against his accusers, the
court of appeals also affirmed the imposition of fees under Rule 11 for
complaining that defendants had violated his rights to counsel and not to
incriminate himself, contentions the court called "far-fetched" and
45. Id. at 184.

46. The third panel member in Analytica was William Campbell, a senior district judge of the
Northern District of Illinois, 708 F.2d at 1265; and the third panel member in Colts was Edward
Dumbauld, a senior district judge of the Western District of Pennsylvania, 775 F.2d at 178.
47. 775 F.2d at 182 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note).
48. 715 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1983).
49. 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
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"hav[ing] no basis in law." 50 In a third case of questionable sanctions,
the court very recently laid fees equally on an employer-client and its law
firm for appealing enforcement of a labor arbitration award, on the
grounds that the appellant should have known it could not successfully
attack the trial court's credibility findings. 5' All this being said, however, although the litigation conduct that triggered the sanctions in these
three cases is not appalling, neither are the cases clear cut examples of
abusive discipline of blameless litigants.
As set forth above, Rule 38 is directed at parties; although the federal courts also have inherent unwritten equitable powers to award fees
personally against lawyers,5 2 the standards for equitable awards and section 1927, which addresses lawyers, are worded somewhat differently
from Rule 38. Nonetheless, the court of appeals has basically run all of
its sources of authority together, turning its attention to lawyers not
based on the differences between Rule 38 and section 1927, but for unarticulated policy reasons. Basically, the cases reveal that the court has
been tagging lawyers, rather than clients, with fees, sanctions, and, as
discussed below, rhetoric, in three circumstances: (1) where the court
sees "front" plaintiffs for a crusade in which it is the lawyer who is the
constant; 53 (2) where the party itself is perceived as unsophisticated;5 4 or
(3) where the erroneous contention is obvious, but so technical that only
55
a lawyer could be expected to know it.
Where fees and sanctions are directed to the lawyers, the court has,
not infrequently, taken the opportunity to administer a public scolding,
too. At present, the court seems to be concentrating its verbal ire on
lawyers who make claims unacceptably beyond the margins of existing
law, 5 6 lend themselves to their clients' blood feuds, 5 7 or commit breaches
of etiquette.5 8
In re TCI, Ltd., a bankruptcy matter, involved all three provoca50. Id. at 205.
51. District No. 8, IAM v. Clearing, 807 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1986).
52. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
53. Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983).
54. Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1986); McCandless v. Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., 697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983).
55. Maneikis v. Jordan, 678 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1982). But cf.District No. 8, 807 F.2d 618,
where none of these factors are apparent fom the opinion.
56. Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1986); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.
1985).
57. Thornton, 787 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1986); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985);
McCandless, 697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983).
58. United States v. Devine, 768 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (district court order allowing oversize
brief affirmed); United States v. Devine, 787 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1986); In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441
(7th Cir. 1985).
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tions. There, the debtor's lawyer filed three successive complaints
against its creditors to try to reverse the sale of property, a sale that had
been the subject of an earlier agreed order in the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy judge dismissed all three complaints and, eventually, levied fees
against the debtor's law firm to compensate the creditors for their efforts
in defending the last two complaints. The district judge affirmed, and all
parties appealed-the losing lawyer from the fee award and the creditors
because they didn't get fees for opposing the first complaint.
The court of appeals characterized the debtor's claims as follows:
The complaint relies upon a supposed promise ... that is neither required by law ...nor established by judicial order ....The amended
and second amended complaints assert that the building itself is personal property, an argument whose only footing is George Orwell's
Newspeak. The claim59with the best pedigree ...had nothing to do
with [the defendants].
Interestingly, the law firm would not back down. The lawyer acted only
at his clients' insistence, the firm contended, adding that the low margins
of profit in a bankruptcy practice did not permit lawyers to do extensive
legal research before filing and that a strict penalty for such unsupported
assertions would stifle their adversarial vigor. The firm concluded by refusing to admit it had been wrong and vowing to continue its conduct.
Not surprisingly, the brief on appeal thus contained few citations to authority or substantive defenses other than a cursory attack on the constitutionality of section 1927. It even contained that bete noire of the
Seventh Circuit, a typo.6°
The court rebuked the lawyers roundly on all three scores. "When
lawyers yield to the temptation to file baseless pleadings to appease clients, however, they must understand that their adversary's fees become a
cost of their business. ' 61 Regarding the dampening of zeal in a low cost
practice, the court said:
An attorney who wants to strike off on a new path in the law must
make an effort to determine the nature of the principles he is applying
(or challenging); he may not impose the expense of doing this on his
adversaries-who are likely to be just as busy and will not be amused
by a claim that the rigors of daily practice excuse legal research. ...
We are . . .not worried about "chilling" the sort of "creativity"
demonstrated by these pleadings. Chilling this sort of "creativity" is
the central function of Section 1927.62
Affirming the fee award below, the court toyed with the idea of adding
59.
60.
61.
62.

769 F.2d at 447.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 446 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 447-48.
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fees for the first complaint but declined, reasoning that the creditors' lawyers probably spent too much time on the matter anyway. 63 Finally, in
response to the debtors' lawyers' attempt to justify themselves on appeal,
the court reviewed in detail the inadequacies it saw in the brief and concluded that the debtors' lawyers should pay the creditors' attorneys' fees
on appeal as well as $1,000 interest on the $8,000 fee award below for
delay.
Well, what's going on? I think both less and more than one would
have guessed. 64 The court's opinions and the nominal changes in the
local rules of appellate procedure seem to be grounded in two principles,
each unassailable. First, frivolous litigation wastes the resources of the
judicial system and also unjustly wastes the resources of the other side.
There is a certain percentage of crazies in any society, and it is difficult to
quibble with the court's efforts to resist being drawn into matters more
appropriate for the opera house than the courthouse. 65 Second, sloppy
litigation is also wasteful. Some of the sloppiness is attributable to the
same cause that makes the pediatrician keep you waiting-lawyers are
greedy and overextended. Some is for the related reason that the
amounts in dispute don't justify the expense involved in doing a careful
job. By raising the standard of performance, the court inevitably raises
the expense of litigation and thus should reduce the flow of business into
the judicial system. In this way, pedagogical habits and political philosophy mesh. But that does make either wrong.
Some of the picture is a little more disturbing. Lawyers are justifiably troubled by the deterioration in the relationship between the bench
and the bar. As for life imitating art, the tone of some of the opinions
resembles more a review of the lawyers' performance in a moot court
exercise than a resolution of real disputes. 66 This phenomenon is most
63. Id. at 448-49.
64. For instance, nothing decided to date in the Seventh Circuit remotely approaches the significance of supervisory matters that confronted in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit this year.
In UniOil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton, 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986), the court affirmed a judgment of close
to $500,000 against a prominent San Francisco plaintiffs' law firm, for failing to make an adequate
factual investigation into their named plaintiff before filing a securities class action. In the same
week, a different panel reversed a district court ruling imposing sanctions against a prominent Chicago law firm for what the trial court characterized as representing as existing law what was at best
an argument for extension of existing law into an undecided area and for failing to cite contrary
authority. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'g 103
F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The trial court ruling in Golden Eagle had elicited some substantial
concern over the "chilling effect."
65. The court has not flinched at applying its scrutiny to cases in which the litigants appearpro
se. See, e.g., Reis v. Morrison, 807 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1986); Ruderer, 614 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1980).
66. See, e.g.., Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text); FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1986) (see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying
text); Bonds v. Coca-Cola, 806 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1986).
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disturbingly reflected in the increase in sua sponte decisions. This Foreword noted two groups of such decisions-the sua sponte raising of jurisdictional defects and the sua sponte imposition of sanctions for
procedural misconduct. Granted that both of these areas involve systemrelated issues that entitle the court to greater leeway, still, the increase of
sua sponte decisions is inevitably accompanied by a loss in effective advocacy and in the dialogue between bench and bar. Moreover, it is often
difficult to tell from the opinions whether the substantive issues discussed
were briefed and argued or emerged from the fertile minds of the able
jurists. The court's recent opinion in Bonds v. Coca-Cola,67 raising, sua
sponte, a tolling argument for the plaintiff, rebuking his lawyer for failing
to see it, and then refusing to consider the argument for lack of assistance
of counsel, raises the disturbing suspicion that the court's willingness to
think up positions on its own may lead litigants out of the courthouse
more often than it admits them.
The escalation of rhetoric from the bench has also contributed to the
deterioration. The briefs and the opinion discussed above in TCI exemplify this phenomenon. Another example appears in the exchange over
the matter of a rehearing in Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Telegraph.68 In that antitrust suit, Judge Posner, writing for himself, Judges Bauer and Flaum, had reversed a large jury verdict for the
plaintiff. The petition for rehearing en banc characterized the panel decision as "seizing this opportunity to preempt the application of the [recent
Supreme Court decision in Aspen Skiing]'s antitrust principles in this
Circuit" and "to emasculate its principles and announce contrary rules
for this Circuit ...consistent with [Judge Posner's] long held personal
view" and engaging in unwarranted "de novo review of the facts," a review that "changes dramatically when Judge Posner is on the panel."' 69
In addition to denying the petition (with nary a vote for rehearing) the
two panel members not the subject of the petitioner's verbal ire concurred specially to rebuke the petitioning lawyers for their tone.7 0
I think that part of the reason for the escalated rhetoric from the
bench is frustration. The statistics set forth above about the percentage
of nonconforming briefs three years after amendment of local Rule 9 are
discouraging, 7' and the descriptions of the quality of the papers
67. 806 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1986).
68. 802 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying rehearing of 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986)), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1574 (1987).
69. Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 1-5 n.5, 18 n.24, Olympia,
802 F.2d 217.
70. Olympia, 802 F.2d at 219-20.
71. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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presented to the courts do not arouse sympathy for their creators. Still,
one is unaccustomed to hearing grown men and women addressed in
such admonitory tones ("Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take
heed!" 72), and the temptation to answer back, as the Olympia lawyers
did, must be very great.
But, in the end, the real developments of significance in this court so
substantially reconstituted and including judges of such great abilities
and commitment, are substantive. And it is to those substantive developments that this symposium is addressed.

72. Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d 247, 256 (7th Cir. 1986).

